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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendants, Universal Rehabilitation Services, Inc. 
(Universal), Attila Horvath, and Richard Lukesh, were 
charged with mail fraud and false claims in a 39 count 
indictment. The government alleged that they conducted a 
Medicare fraud scheme over a three-year period. The jury 
convicted the defendants only on a mail fraud count, Count 
One, the earliest count of the indictment. The government 
now argues that evidence of illegal activity, which occurred 
after the date of the offense in Count One but still within 
the three-year period of the originally charged scheme, can 
be used to sustain the verdict of guilty on Count One. 
 
In this appeal, we must determine to what extent post- 
offense evidence can be considered to support the 
conviction on Count One. We must also decide whether the 
District Court properly admitted into evidence the guilty 
pleas of two testifying mid-level managers after defendants 
had represented to the court that they would not, on cross 
examination, challenge the credibility of these witnesses or 
otherwise make the pleas admissible. 
 
I. Facts 
 
The corporate defendant, Universal, provided 
rehabilitative services, including speech therapy, to 
Medicare patients in nursing homes. The patients served 
were primarily the elderly. Universal submitted claims for 
the patients it treated to Independence Blue Cross (IBC), 
which administered Medicare coverage. IBC would then 
submit claims to Medicare. 
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Medicare is authorized to reimburse speech therapy 
treatments that are both medically reasonable and 
necessary. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1395 et seq. and its 
implementing regulations, manuals are published that 
provide Medicare coverage guidelines. These include four 
criteria to determine if the treatment is medically 
reasonable and necessary, and therefore reimbursable: 1) 
the therapy must be safe and effective for treatment of the 
patient's condition; 2) the services provided to the patient 
must be of a level of complexity that the services can only 
be provided by a certified speech pathologist; 3) where 
restorative treatment is ordered, there must be an 
expectation that the services being provided to the patient 
will bring about significant improvement in a reasonable 
period of time; and 4) the frequency and duration of 
services must be reasonable and necessary for the patient's 
condition. 
 
Universal therapists would evaluate patients in accord 
with the physician's orders and prepare a plan of 
treatment. The evaluation and plan of treatment must state 
whether the treatment is in fact necessary. The evaluation 
and plan is then approved (signed) by the doctor. As 
treatment progresses, speech therapists create progress 
notes. If treatment is to continue, Medicare requires that 
the need for it be certified every 30 days by a medical 
doctor. Medicare will continue to pay for speech therapy as 
long as patients are making progress toward the goals 
established in the plan of treatment. The doctor executes 
the 30 day certification by signing a Medical Information 
Form (MIF), which contains a summary, primarily from the 
therapists' progress notes, of the previous 30 days of 
treatment, as well as a recommended course of treatment 
for next 30 days. 
 
Universal submitted electronic Medicare bills to IBC. 
Essentially, IBC would review Universal's reimbursement 
claims. Universal and IBC often disagreed about the 
interpretation of Medicare guidelines and the propriety of 
the bills submitted. At some point, IBC began requesting 
that Universal supply the following documentation to 
support the electronic bills: a) the evaluation and plan of 
treatment, b) the progress notes, and c) the MIFs. 
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Claims that were rejected would be "rewritten" by 
Universal staff. Depending on the reason for rejection, the 
"rewriting" to obtain reimbursement might be fraudulent. 
For example, if information was missing from a form, 
Universal personnel would "rewrite" the form to include the 
missing information. Other "rewriting," however, was not as 
innocuous. For example, a mid-level corporate employee 
pled guilty to mail fraud for falsifying the performance 
record of a patient on certain speech therapy tests to create 
the "appearance" that the patient had made progress, 
thereby rendering the services reimbursable. In fact, the 
patient was not making progress and the services should 
not have been reimbursable. Another type of "rewriting" 
consisted of changing evaluations and MIFs after the doctor 
had signed them. The doctor's signature would then be 
taped and xeroxed onto the "rewritten" forms. 
 
The government alleged that a mail fraud scheme 
occurred from the summer of 1988 through September 21, 
1991, during which 1) evaluations and plans of treatment 
were rewritten to create the "appearance" of patients who 
could properly receive reimbursable therapy; 2) MIFs 
containing physician's certifications were falsified, that is, 
altered after the doctor originally signed them and the 
signature photocopied back on; and 3) progress notes were 
altered to conform with the falsified evaluation and MIFs. A 
grand jury indicted Attila Horvath, Vice President and 
Director of Finance at Universal; Richard Lukesh, Director 
of Operations at Universal; Universal, the corporation itself; 
and three other Universal employees for mail fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341 (Counts One through 
Seventeen, charging 17 mailings in furtherance of the 
fraud), and false claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 287 
(Counts Eighteen through Thirty-nine). 
 
After a jury trial, Horvath, Lukesh and Universal were 
convicted on Count One and acquitted on each of the other 
38 counts, representing 16 other mailings and false claims 
that arose from the practice of falsifying speech therapy 
documents. Count One charged that, in furtherance of the 
scheme, Blue Cross mailed a check, dated May 10, 1989, to 
Universal. The check represented a claim for treatment 
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rendered to a patient, Mildred Hynds, from February 15 to 
28, 1989.1 
 
Before trial, defendants had moved in limine to prevent 
the government from presenting evidence that government 
witnesses Judy Blum Bonjo and Penny Martin, employees 
of Universal, had pled guilty to mail fraud.2 Defendants 
promised that they would not challenge these witnesses' 
credibility on cross-examination. Defendants argued that 
the guilty pleas were not relevant under Rule 401 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and, if relevant, were more 
prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. The District 
Court denied the motion in limine. Defendants appeal this 
evidentiary ruling. 
 
After the verdict, defendants moved for a Fed. R. Crim. P. 
Rule 29 judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court 
denied the motion. Defendants appeal this ruling as well.3 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
federal indictments, charging violations of the federal 
criminal code. We have appellate jurisdiction over 
defendants' direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Immediately after the jury returned its verdict of 
conviction on Count One, defendants moved for acquittal 
under Rule 29, arguing that there was insufficient evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Counts Two, Three, and Four also involved the mailing of checks that 
pertained to Mildred Hynds. Count Twenty-seven charged a false claim 
arising out of a bill that was submitted for the treatment of Hynds. 
 
2. Blum Bonjo testified that she had pled guilty to Count One of the 
indictment before the jury. App. 2190. Martin was charged in a separate 
indictment and testified that she had pled guilty to one count of mail 
fraud. 
 
3. The government also filed a cross-appeal, claiming that the District 
Court erred at sentencing in refusing to consider the fraud loss from the 
"virtually identical" conduct charged in the other 38 acquitted counts as 
relevant conduct under Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Because of our holding on defendants' appeal, we do not reach the 
government's cross-appeal. 
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to sustain the verdict. The District Court denied the motion 
as to all three defendants. United States v. Universal 
Rehabilitation Services, Inc., Attila Horvath, and Richard 
Lukesh, No. 94-147, E.D.Pa., slip op. 3-12, May 31, 1996. 
We review de novo the district court's denial of a post- 
verdict judgment of acquittal. United States v. Iafelice, 978 
F.2d 92 (3d. Cir. 1992). 
 
We apply the same legal standard as the District Court. 
We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict and presume that the jury properly 
evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, found the facts, 
and drew rational inferences. Id. at 94. In that light, we 
"must affirm the convictions if a rational trier of fact could 
have found defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the verdict is supported by substantial evidence." U.S. 
v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
"The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1341, proscribes any 
scheme or artifice to defraud in which the defendant 
participated with the specific intent to defraud and in 
which the mails were used `in furtherance of the fraudulent 
scheme.' " Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1243."Proof of specific intent 
. . . may be found from a material misstatement of fact 
made with reckless disregard for the truth." United States 
v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). As such, 
the government must prove that a scheme to defraud 
existed, that each defendant participated in that scheme, 
and that each participated with specific intent to defraud. 
United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 
It follows from the above that an individual must join a 
scheme while the scheme exists; that is, that the scheme 
and a defendant's knowing participation in it must occur 
over the same period of time. In this case, the government 
alleged in the thirty-nine count indictment that a scheme 
took place from the summer of 1988 through September 
21, 1991. However, the jury convicted the defendants only 
on Count One, the May 10, 1989, mailing. The jury 
acquitted the defendants on the remaining 38 counts, 
relating to mailings and false claims after May 10, 1989. 
Thus, we must define the period of time which constitutes 
the scheme for which the jury convicted the defendants. 
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Because of the acquittals on Counts Two through Thirty- 
nine, the scheme could not have run through the entire 
period which the government charged in the indictment. 
Nevertheless, May 10, 1989, the date of the offense charged 
in Count One, is not necessarily the evidentiary cut-off. We 
must determine whether events that took place after May 
10, 1989, up until September 1991, can be used to support 
the jury verdict on the May 10 mailing. 
 
The government argues that the scheme is not bound in 
time by the May 10, 1989, mailing -- that the Hynds check, 
the subject of Count One, was a mailing in furtherance of 
a broad three year scheme. However, as we made clear in 
United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), in 
the context of a conspiracy to commit mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371, the conspiracy at issue "was a 
conspiracy to violate the mail fraud statute, which end[s] 
with the last mailing." Id. at 1232. As such, willful 
membership in the scheme must have existed on or before 
May 10, 1989, the date of the mailing for the count of 
conviction. There is no concept of retroactive joinder in mail 
fraud schemes after the last culpable mailing. Moreover, 
because the defendants were acquitted of the later- 
occurring mail fraud counts, those mailings cannot be 
considered to be "culpable mailings." 
 
Furthermore, the fact that Pflaumer concerned conspiracy 
to commit mail fraud, not just mail fraud, is a distinction 
without a difference under the circumstances of this case. 
A conspiracy to violate a substantive prohibition in a 
federal statute ends when the unlawful object of the 
conspiracy has been accomplished. Grunewald v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 391, 406-15 (1957). In Pflaumer, the object 
of the conspiracy was the use of the mails to effectuate a 
scheme to defraud states of tax revenues. Although the 
scheme to defraud the states may have continued past the 
last mailing, the use of the mails to effectuate the scheme 
ceased upon the last mailing. 774 F.2d at 1232. 
 
As was the situation in Pflaumer, the object of the 
scheme here was mail fraud, the mailing was in 
furtherance of the scheme, and the mailing marks the end 
of the scheme. To be sure, subsequent words and deeds 
may bear on whether a person was participating and 
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participating willfully in a scheme. For example, a 
statement by a defendant after the end of the scheme may 
make clear that he was in fact willfully participating in, or 
had knowledge of, the scheme before it ended. There must, 
however, be substantial evidence of participation before the 
mailing. United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
 
A. Evidence That a Crime Was Committed 
 
The question then is whether there is sufficient evidence 
of events prior to the May 10, 1989, mailing to sustain the 
jury verdict? To sustain the jury verdict, in addition to 
demonstrating that each defendant willfully joined the mail 
fraud scheme, the government must produce sufficient 
evidence that a mail fraud scheme existed. This means that 
there must be sufficient evidence that the Hynds mailing 
was in furtherance of a mail fraud scheme, i.e. , that the 
services to Mildred Hynds for which defendants billed and 
were paid $1,411 by IBC's check # 0249905, dated May 10, 
1989, were unauthorized under Medicare coverage 
guidelines and that defendants' misrepresentation of these 
services was part of the scheme to defraud. 
 
Defendants argue that there was no evidence that a 
crime was in fact committed. They argue that the evidence 
indicates that the treatment rendered to Hynds was 
authorized by her physician as medically necessary and 
appropriate. The record reveals a different story. Carol 
Pomilio, a speech therapist at Universal, testified that 
Medicare initially rejected the Hynds billing. In order to 
obtain reimbursement, the February 15, 1989, evaluation 
and plan of treatment, which the doctor had signed, was 
destroyed and replaced by one with an altered evaluation 
that did not accurately reflect Hynds' treatment plan. The 
doctor's signature was then xeroxed onto the altered 
document. As documentary support for this treatment plan, 
Pomilio lowered the scoring percentages on the progress 
notes. The fact that the treatment was originally ordered by 
a doctor does not neutralize the fraud; i.e., that the billing 
for the continued treatment, based on falsified progress 
notes and a xeroxed doctor's signature, was fraudulent. 
 
There is no doubt that, as defendants argue, the 
rewriting of or resubmission of rewritten documents is not 
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per se fraudulent. In fact, Julia Blum Bonjo, another 
Universal speech therapist, testified that a large part of her 
job consisted of legitimate rewriting or redrafting of 
documents. However, when the rewriting consisted of 
misrepresentation of a patient's test results with the intent 
of obtaining otherwise unauthorized reimbursement, there 
is sufficient evidence to find an underlying scheme to 
defraud, which is required as an element of the offense of 
mail fraud. 
 
The next question we must consider is whether there is 
sufficient evidence that each of the defendants willfully 
joined the scheme to commit mail fraud. United States v. 
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 537. In this connection, the 
government must prove that each defendant willfully joined 
the scheme before May 10, 1989, the date of the last 
mailing in furtherance of the scheme. It must show that 
each defendant possessed the requisite intent to defraud. 
Proof is required that "defendants must either have devised 
the fraudulent scheme themselves, or have wilfully 
participated in it with knowledge of its fraudulent intent." 
Id. A defendant need not personally be involved with the 
actual mailing to be liable so long as there was knowledge 
that the use of mails would follow in the ordinary course of 
business or that such use can reasonably be foreseen. 
United States v. Sturm, 671 F.2d 749, 751 (3d Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 1990).4 
 
B. Evidence Linking Defendant Horvath to the Crime 
 
We will first examine the evidence against defendant 
Attila Horvath up to and through the May 10, 1989, mailing 
of the count of conviction. The government must prove that 
Horvath willfully joined the scheme before that date. The 
District Court enumerated specific record references to 
Horvath's knowledge and willful participation in the scheme 
upon which the jury could have relied. However, once we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Defendants also contend in their appeals that there was insufficient 
evidence of the use of the mails. We have reviewed the evidence of the 
business practices and of specific reference to the correspondence in 
question, and we will affirm the District Court on this point. See United 
States v. Burks, 867 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Hannigan, 
27 F.3d 890 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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eliminate the post-May 1989 evidence, there is little of any 
significance. 
 
(1) There is the testimony of Wendy Gold, who was 
Director of Speech Therapy before Penny Martin. Gold 
testified that on April 28, 1989, she discussed with Horvath 
and Lukesh the problem of over-utilization, i.e., treating 
patients unnecessarily to increase production. Moreover, 
Gold discussed with Horvath the fact that many of the 
patients in the nursing homes with which Universal 
contracted would not qualify for Medicare therapy. At this 
meeting and in subsequent memos, dated May 8 and May 
15, 1989, there was extensive discussion about ways to 
increase productivity. There was, however, no evidence that 
anyone suggested falsification in billing. Gold took the 
position that asking therapists to do what Universal wanted 
done in order to increase production would not be ethical. 
Gold subsequently quit due to pressure to increase 
production. 
 
(2) Judy Blum Bonjo, Director of Utilization Review, 
testified that her department was directed by Horvath in an 
April 15, 1991, memo to bill the "risk patients" in order to 
reduce documentation backlogs. This evidence is not 
relevant, however, because it refers to an event more than 
2 years after the Count One mailing. Additionally, Horvath 
argues that the memo refers to billing prior to receipt of all 
the paperwork, not to falsifying information. 
 
Blum Bonjo also testified that Horvath directed her to bill 
without physician signatures and without some requisite 
documentation in place. This evidence is problematic 
because there is no reference to its date. Horvath asserts, 
and the Government does not controvert, that this 
reference is to the same April 15, 1991, memo and for that 
reason occurred after the Count One mailing. 
 
(3) Penny Martin, Director of Speech Therapy after Gold, 
testified that Horvath wanted patient documentation 
billable no matter what had to be done. Martin explained 
that Horvath ran weekly meetings and closely monitored 
the results of speech therapy practices at Universal. 
Furthermore, Martin explained that between 1989 and 
1991 Blum Bonjo met with Lukesh on a daily basis and 
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with Horvath and Lukesh on a weekly basis. Once again, 
Horvath asserts, and the Government does not controvert, 
that Martin's testimony refers to her observations of what 
Horvath told her in June 1990, one year after the Count 
One mailing. In fact, Martin did not join Universal until 
August 1989, several months after the Count One mailing. 
 
Examined as a whole, the record is extremely sparse as 
to Horvath's willful participation in the scheme before May 
10, 1989. The only evidence that clearly concerns pre- 
mailing events is the Gold testimony. This testimony, 
however, only establishes pressure to bill, not pressure to 
bill falsely. Although we hesitate to overturn a jury verdict, 
we conclude in this instance that, after we exclude the 
post-mailing evidence, upon which the jury likely relied, 
there is little to support the jury's verdict. As such, we hold 
that the District Court erred in denying Horvath's motion 
for judgment of acquittal. We will remand the case to the 
District Court to enter a judgment of acquittal for Horvath. 
 
C. Evidence Linking Defendant Lukesh to Crime  
 
Contrary to Horvath, the relevant evidence against 
Lukesh is stronger. 
 
1) Lukesh admitted he was aware that documents were 
being rewritten in order to "augment" the billing record. A 
memo, dated Oct. 28, 1988, directed therapists "to be 
creative" in getting Medicare reimbursements. On cross- 
examination, Lukesh testified that one such "creative way" 
to get reimbursed was to rewrite the document to change 
the patient profile. Defendants point out that no witness 
ever testified to interpreting the term "creative" to imply 
falsification. Nevertheless, the jury could infer Lukesh's 
state of mind from his choice of words. 
 
2) Lukesh authored a document in the spring of 1988 
known as the "billing hold" which became an administrative 
measure at Universal. This directive was designed to gather 
information on what billing documents were being held up 
and for what reason. It was provided to the speech 
therapists, often with specific directions on how to alter 
speech therapy documents. While it is possible that Lukesh 
did not intend that the rewriting of documents, pursuant to 
this directive, would be fraudulent (Lukesh testified that he 
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believed documents were merely being corrected or 
augmented), the jury was certainly entitled to infer that 
Lukesh had knowledge of the fraudulent billing practices. 
 
3) Lukesh was present at an April, 1989, meeting where 
Blue Cross alerted Universal that documents "were being 
improperly altered and inappropriate patients were being 
treated." Lukesh's contention as to the billing hold directive 
described above, that he believed documents were merely 
being corrected or augmented, is belied by this meeting 
with Blue Cross. The information gathered by Lukesh at the 
meeting, together with his authoring of the directive, lead to 
the permissible inference that Lukesh knew, well before the 
Count One mailing, that his employees were falsifying 
documents. 
 
4) Karen Lightman Pallies, a speech therapist from 
January 1989 through September 1989, testified that she 
was required to falsify her therapy documentation and that 
Lukesh told the therapists at a pre-May 1989 meeting that 
reports were being rejected by Blue Cross and the 
therapists would have to keep rewriting these reports until 
they were accepted. Pallies did admit that re-writing could 
involve simply "documenting accurate historical facts" as 
distinguished from "making something up." 
 
5) Blum Bonjo and Martin testified that Lukesh was 
aware that documents were being altered before being 
submitted to Blue Cross for payment. The testimony by 
Martin is problematic because she started working after the 
Count One mailing. Furthermore, Lukesh asserts, and the 
government does not controvert, that Blum Bonjo's 
testimony refers to events around April 1990, after the 
mailing. 
 
6) Therapist Audrey Isaak told the jury that she attended 
regular staff meetings between 1988 and 1991 and at one, 
Lukesh told the staff that "our documentation need[s] to be 
written in such a way that payment would be granted." 
 
Clearly, the evidence against Lukesh is more substantial 
than that against Horvath. Certainly Lukesh's authoring of 
documents designed to effectuate a policy of resubmitting 
bills and rewriting the documents underlying them, a policy 
that led therapists to submit fraudulent documents, 
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provides evidence of intent on Lukesh's part. When this 
evidence is coupled with the fact that Lukesh was informed 
by Blue Cross of the fraudulent practices, there was 
sufficient evidence that Lukesh willfully joined the scheme 
to commit mail fraud. 
 
D. Evidence Linking the Corporation to the Crime 
 
Universal, the corporate defendant, argues as the basis 
for its post-verdict judgment of acquittal motion that there 
was not substantial evidence that it directed its employees 
to falsify claims. "A corporation is criminally responsible for 
the unlawful acts of its employees or other agents, provided 
such unlawful acts are done on behalf of the corporation 
and within the scope of the agent's employment or apparent 
authority." United States v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 205 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 
Universal argues that there was never a corporate policy 
of falsifying claims and that no individual was directed to 
falsify claims on behalf of the company. Universal contends 
that the individual defendants were acting on their own. 
This argument has no merit. As the District Court 
explained, without even considering the guilt of the high- 
level officials Horvath and Lukesh, the evidence was 
sufficient for the jury to have concluded that Carol Pomilio 
was acting within the scope of her authority and in the 
course of her employment with the intent to benefit 
Universal when she knowingly misled Medicare by altering 
Hynds' patient documentation. Additionally, numerous 
witnesses testified that they were pressured to bill for 
treatment to inappropriate patients and to rewrite patient 
documentation in order to make claims reimbursable, i.e., 
to benefit the corporation. For these reasons, wefind 
sufficient evidence to support the conviction of defendant 
Universal. 
 
III. Admissibility of the Guilty Plea of a Testifying Co- 
     Defendant 
 
Julia Blum Bonjo, a speech therapist at Universal, pled 
guilty to Count One, the mail fraud count on which the 
other defendants were later convicted. Penny Martin also 
pled guilty in a separate information to one count of mail 
fraud. In exchange for the pleas, Blum Bonjo and Martin 
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agreed to testify as government witnesses. Before the trial, 
defendants moved to bar testimony of the pleas. In their 
motion, defendants argued that the plea agreements were 
irrelevant, and, even if they were relevant, they were more 
prejudicial than probative. Defendants represented that 
they would not examine Blum Bonjo or Martin in any way 
that would make this evidence admissible, i.e., they would 
not challenge their credibility. Moreover, defense counsel 
asserted that, even if the government was skeptical about 
his representation that he would not challenge the 
credibility of Blum Bonjo or Martin on cross examination, 
the proper procedure was for the court to then permit the 
government to prove the pleas on redirect. 
 
The District Court denied defendants' motion. Relying on 
United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 1994), the court 
explained that, although a guilty plea cannot be used to 
establish a co-conspirator's guilt, it can be introduced for 
some valid purpose. After enumerating the proper purposes 
for which the pleas could be admitted, the trial judge found 
that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial effect and admitted it, denying defendants' 
motion. The defendants assert that this ruling was 
erroneous and that the error was not harmless, arguing 
that "there is a high probability that the jury's conviction 
on Count One -- in light of its acquittal verdicts on close to 
40 other counts -- was influenced by the Bonjo plea to 
Count One."5 
 
The decision to admit or exclude the evidence is 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. In 
re Merritt Logan Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990). We 
use an abuse of discretion standard to review the District 
Court's decision not to exclude evidence under Rule 403. 
United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We note at the outset the well-settled proposition that 
plea agreements of co-conspirators cannot be used as 
evidence of a defendant's guilt. Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476. We 
stated in United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 
1991) that: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In her testimony, Blum Bonjo stated that she had pled guilty to 
"Count One." 
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       [t]here are strong considerations against using a co- 
       conspirator's guilt as substantive evidence of another 
       defendant's guilt. "The foundation of [this] policy is the 
       right of every defendant to stand or fall with the proof 
       of the charge made against him, not against somebody 
       else . . . . The defendant ha[s] a right to have his guilt 
       or innocence determined by the evidence presented 
       against him, not by what has happened with regard to 
       a criminal prosecution against someone else. 
 
926 F.2d at 1363 (quoting in part Bisaccia v. Attorney 
General of New Jersey, 623 F.2d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 
However, we have recognized certain valid purposes for 
which co-conspirators' guilty pleas can be admitted. See, 
e.g., Gaev, 24 F.3d 476-77 (enumerating proper purposes). 
The District Court here explained that a plea was 
admissible for a number of valid purposes. First, the court 
explained that a plea was admissible to assist the jury in 
assessing the credibility of the testifying witness. As we 
explained in Gambino, "by eliciting the witness' guilty plea 
on direct examination, the government dampens attacks on 
credibility, and forecloses any suggestion that it was 
concealing evidence." 926 F.2d at 1363. But, defendants in 
their pre-trial motion pledged not to challenge Blum Bonjo's 
and Martin's credibility based on their plea agreements. 
Thus, there was no reason to allow the government this 
pre-emptive strike on direct examination. See United States 
v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The District Court also justified its ruling on the motion 
in limine after the trial by referring to defendants' cross- 
examination of Blum Bonjo. The court explained that 
defendants challenged critical aspects of Blum Bonjo's 
participation in the activities that formed the basis for the 
mail fraud charge. One cannot, however, use defense 
counsel's behavior after denial of the motion as any 
indication of what he would have done had his motion been 
granted by the court. 
 
The District Court also explained that the pleas were 
admissible to make clear that defendants were not being 
singled out for selective prosecution. Indeed in United 
States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other 
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grounds, 106 S.Ct. 1121 (1986), we allowed the admission 
of a co-conspirator's guilty plea "in order to rebut defense 
counsel's persistent attempts on cross-examination to raise 
an inference that the co-conspirators had not been 
prosecuted, and that [the defendant] had been singled out 
for prosecution." Id. at 384, n.2. But that is not the case 
here. Defense counsel in his motion in limine pledged not 
to engage in questioning on cross examination that would 
render the pleas admissible. Certainly, if the defense had 
raised an inference of selective prosecution, this tactic 
would have been covered by counsel's pledge. However, 
selective prosecution never became an issue in this case. In 
Thomas, where selective prosecution was also not an issue, 
we explained that "there was no need to mention the guilty 
pleas to deter any concern that Thomas was being singled 
out for prosecution." 998 F.2d at 1205. Moreover, even if 
the implication of selective prosection had become an issue, 
it could have been dealt with by instructing the jury that 
the issue of selective prosecution was not their concern. Id. 
 
The trial court suggested a further reason to admit the 
plea -- to explain the witnesses' firsthand knowledge of the 
defendant's misdeeds. See United States v. Halbert, 640 
F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981). But a witness's guilty plea 
doesn't establish her basis of knowledge. The witness's 
testimony itself will establish that basis. 
 
After the valid purposes for which the plea may be 
admissible are proffered, the trial court must balance the 
probative value of the testimony with its prejudicial effect. 
The standard for the balancing is that of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403.6 That is, the prejudice that inures to the 
defendant by the admission of a co-conspirator's guilty plea 
may be overcome by its probative value. Furthermore, in 
some circumstances, a limiting instruction against the use 
of the plea as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: 
 
       Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is 
       substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
       confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations 
       of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
       cumulative evidence. 
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was given in this case, reduces that prejudice. United States 
v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 1991). However, in 
Gaev, we recognized that "there may be cases where the 
inference of guilt from the co-conspirator's plea agreement 
is sufficiently strong that even limiting instructions will not 
effectively contain it." 24 F.3d at 478. This is one of those 
cases. 
 
Notwithstanding the limiting instruction here, the jury, 
having heard evidence accusing defendants of 39 counts of 
mail fraud and false claims, acquitted all 3 defendants on 
38 of the counts. The only count of conviction was the one 
to which the government's star witness, Blum Bonjo, a mid- 
level employee, had pled guilty. In addition, the patient 
involved in Count One, Mildred Hynds, was also involved in 
four other counts on which defendants were acquitted. It 
would appear then that whether a particular patient needed 
treatment, at least in the Hynds case, was not a 
determining factor in the jury verdict. Moreover, the 
government has conceded in its cross-appeal that the 
conduct charged in the other 38 counts was virtually 
identical to the conduct charged in Count One. The 
evidence cited by the government, in arguing that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the convictions on Count 
One, is for a large part the same evidence that the jury 
heard and then found not to support conviction on 38 of 
the counts. There is, therefore, the strong possibility that 
Blum Bonjo's guilty plea to that count was considered by 
the jury as direct evidence against the defendants. 
 
Concerning the probative value of the pleas, as we have 
described above, the proffered reasons for admitting the 
evidence were weak. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
discretion due a district court judge making an evidentiary 
determination, we find that the probative value of the pleas 
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. Despite the fact that we have found sufficient 
evidence to support Lukesh and Universal's convictions, the 
evidence on the count of conviction was very similar to the 
evidence supporting the thirty-eight acquitted counts. In 
view of the fact that the only distinguishing evidence on the 
count of conviction is the consideration of the co- 
conspirators' guilty pleas, we must conclude that the denial 
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of defendants' motion in limine and the subsequent 
introduction at trial of evidence of Blum Bonjo's and 
Martin's guilty pleas was reversible error. We will reverse 
the judgment of conviction as regards Lukesh and Universal.7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
       For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the 
conviction of Attila Horvath for the insufficiency of the 
evidence against him and remand his case to the District 
Court for entry of a judgment of acquittal. We will reverse 
the convictions of defendants Lukesh and Universal and 
remand their cases to the District Court for a new trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As regards Horvath, our holding that the post-verdict judgment of 
acquittal should have been granted renders moot his appeal of the denial 
of the motion in limine. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The majority of the panel (my colleagues Judges Roth 
and McKee) have reviewed the record and reversed the 
conviction of the defendant Attila Horvath ("Horvath"), who 
had been charged with mail fraud in conducting a Medicare 
fraud scheme over a three-year period.1  In doing so, they 
have directed Horvath's acquittal on Count One2 despite the 
credible evidence found against him by the jury and despite 
the District Court's application of the undeniably correct 
standard, under United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60 
(1942), which requires affirmance of a conviction so long as 
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, with all 
reasonable inferences viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Government. That standard, to which this Court 
adheres, requires an affirmance of the defendants' 
convictions on this appeal. 
 
A. 
 
In light of the majority's rejection of the jury's verdict, 
which is tested by the Glasser standard just adverted to, 
and in light of an even more erroneous holding that 
completely eviscerates the deference which we are required 
to give to a District Court's discretionary ruling to admit 
pleas of codefendants,3 I must respectfully dissent. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The damage from Medicare fraud has been extensive. See, e.g., 
Medicare Contractors Aren't Pursuing Fraud, Audit Shows, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 2, 1998, at A1; Probers Allege Medicare Fraud by Columbia/HCA, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 11, 1998, at N3 (disclosing investigation of 
nationwide Medicare fraud by large health care organization); Fraud and 
Waste in Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at A30 (stating 
government estimates approximately $23 billion per year lost to Medicare 
fraud). 
 
2. Count One charged that Horvath, Lukesh and Universal violated 18 
U.S.C. section 1341, which proscribes use of the mails in furtherance of 
a fraudulent scheme. 
 
3. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (recognizing, in 
context of expert testimony, that trial courts have discretion to admit 
such testimony, and rejecting standard that "fail[s] to give the trial 
court 
the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion review"). A long 
line of cases from this Court has respected the District Court's 
discretion 
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B. 
 
Indeed, I dissent not only from the majority's insistence 
on refusing the admission of the guilty pleas of 
codefendants Penny Martin and Judy Blum Bonjo on the 
record presented here, but I strongly urge the full court to 
grant en banc consideration to what can only be 
characterized as an aberration in our jurisprudence-- an 
aberration dictated in the first instance by the suspect 
holding in United States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202 (3d Cir. 
1993). In Thomas, in the face of a compelling and reasoned 
dissent by Judge Rosenn of this Court, our own precedents, 
decisions from our sister Circuits,4 and fully documented 
and detailed discretionary rulings by the District Court 
Judge, the same distorted result as to the exclusion of a 
plea agreement gave rise to the same miscarriage of justice 
that we now see here. 
 
Our court -- the full court -- should undertake to clarify 
this significant aspect of our criminal jurisprudence by 
vacating the instant majority opinion, by rehearing the 
issue en banc, and by reaffirming the standard that Judge 
Scirica of this Court found appropriate in Gaev . It should 
re-align the Third Circuit on the correct and proper course, 
which provides for the acceptance of guilty pleas at trial by 
codefendants when the correct standard of a District 
Court's discretion is applied to the facts and when the 
proper purposes of credibility, selective prosecution and 
establishing firsthand knowledge are found, as they were 
unquestionably applied by the District Court and found 
here. Such a course would comport with the jurisprudence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in admitting pleas of codefendants. See United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 
473 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1015 (1994); United States v. 
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 956 (1991); 
United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Gullo, 502 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). Indeed, this Court has held 
repeatedly that admission of a plea, without more, is not ordinarily 
reversible. See, e.g., United States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 
1966). 
 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1092 (1990); United States v. Louis, 814 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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of our sister Circuits that have wisely, and in accord with 
prevailing legal standards, accepted such evidence. 
 
Based on the record before us, I believe (1) that the 
evidence was sufficient to support Horvath's conviction, and 
(2) that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the codefendants' guilty pleas, and that the guilty 
pleas were admitted for a proper purpose and did not 
invalidate the convictions of all the defendants. Therefore, 
I would hold the majority's disregard of the District Court's 
rulings and its reversal of those convictions is unwarranted 
and violates both the District Court's and this Court's 
proper standards of review. 
 
C. 
 
Although not addressed in the majority opinion, see 
Majority Op. at 6 n.3, I further conclude that pursuant to 
the teaching of United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), 
the District Court grievously erred in not considering 
acquitted and uncharged conduct pursuant to Section 
2F1.1 of the Guidelines in calculating the Sentencing 
Guidelines range of each of the defendants. 
 
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's decision to 
remand Horvath's case to the District Court to enter a 
judgment of acquittal, and to reverse the convictions of 
Lukesh and Universal and remand for a new trial on Count 
One. 
 
I 
 
As the majority opinion notes, see Majority Op. at 6, 
Horvath, Lukesh and Universal appealed the denial by the 
District Court of their post-conviction motion for a 
judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
These defendants had moved for relief on the basis of 
insufficiency of the evidence and claimed that the 
admission of the codefendants' guilty pleas were unduly 
prejudicial. 
 
Prior to that motion, however, these defendants had 
made an in limine motion to exclude testimony concerning 
the plea agreements entered into by the codefendants. The 
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District Court took the matter under advisement, accepted 
submissions by the parties and heard argument as to the 
applicable legal principles. The District Court, in its 
discretion, denied the motion, concluding that 
 
       if [Bonjo and Martin] testify the jury is going to 
       certainly wonder whether or not they have been 
       charged. It's going to wonder perhaps what they have 
       been promised by the prosecutor if anything and what 
       they may be getting in return for their testimony. 
 
       I think in weighing all of those factors with the possible 
       prejudice that I am going to allow the Government to 
       bring out the fact of the guilty plea and the fact of the 
       guilty plea agreement. 
 
The District Court considered the issue again after the 
conclusion of the trial. In denying these defendants' post- 
conviction motion, the District Court first noted that, in a 
motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the court 
 
       must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
       the government. A claim of insufficiency places a very 
       heavy burden on the [defendants]. [The court] must 
       affirm the convictions if a rational trier of fact could 
       have found defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable 
       doubt, and the verdict is supported by substantial 
       evidence. 
 
       The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1341, proscribes 
       any "scheme or artifice to defraud" in which the 
       defendant participated with the specific intent to 
       defraud and in which the mails were used "in 
       furtherance of the fraudulent scheme." The scheme 
       "need not be fraudulent on its face but must involve 
       some sort of fraudulent misrepresentations or 
       omissions reasonably calculated to deceive persons of 
       ordinary prudence and comprehension." Proof of 
       specific intent is required, which "may be found from a 
       material misstatement of fact made with reckless 
       disregard for the truth." United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 
       1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, a 
       mail fraud conviction stands where the evidence 
       demonstrates a defendant's willful participation in a 
       scheme to defraud with knowledge of its fraudulent 
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       nature. See United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 
       537 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
In denying the motion, the District Court conducted a 
careful review of the evidence indicating a crime had been 
committed, and the evidence connecting each defendant to 
the crime. After outlining the testimony and documentation 
connecting Horvath and the other defendants to the crime 
charged in Count One, the District Court summarized the 
evidence as follows: 
 
       In the instant case, the individual defendants' guilty 
       knowledge could rationally be inferred beyond a 
       reasonable doubt from (1) the active parts Horvath and 
       Lukesh played in the daily operation of the speech 
       therapy practice, (2) [d]efendants' knowledge and 
       monitoring of Universal's billing problems -- the 
       number of patient cases being billed and met with 
       record requests, denials and increased scrutiny by 
       Blue Cross . . . (3) the testimony of key administrators, 
       Julia Blum Bonjo, Penny Martin and Wendy Gold, 
       recalling how Horvath and Lukesh wanted patient 
       documentation billable no matter what had to be done 
       to it, and (4) the directives given to speech therapists 
       by their supervisors, under tremendous pressure from 
       Lukesh and Horvath, to pick up patients, even though 
       inappropriate, to warrant skilled services, and to 
       rewrite patient documentation to make patient services 
       "billable" and reimbursable by Medicare. 
 
The District Court found this evidence sufficient to support 
the jury's finding that a crime had been committed and that 
Horvath and Lukesh (and, through their actions, Universal) 
had the intent required under the mail fraud statute. 
Neither the appellants nor the majority have given any 
reason to question that conclusion by the District Court or 
the jury's verdict. 
 
The District Court next addressed the issue of admission 
of the plea agreements. It reiterated its concern over 
selective prosecution, and noted as well that the testimony 
from Bonjo and Martin would assist the jury in assessing 
credibility. I believe that the majority has artfully finessed 
the issue of admitting the codefendants' guilty pleas, 
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without ever providing reasons or presenting evidence that 
the District Court had abused its discretion - indeed, 
without ever even holding that the District Court Judge did 
so. In so doing, the majority has not dealt fairly with the 
jurisprudence dealing with this subject, and has ignored a 
completely developed record. I thus turn first to the District 
Court's rulings admitting the guilty pleas. I do so observing 
that the admission of the guilty pleas at trial does not 
impact upon the other, independently sufficient evidence 
against the defendants. 
 
II 
 
The panel majority has reversed the Count One 
convictions of Lukesh and Universal because of the putative 
prejudicial effect that the introduction of Bonjo's and 
Martin's guilty pleas had at trial. Although the majority 
does not address this issue with respect to Horvath, it is 
obvious that the admission of the guilty pleas did not affect 
the other evidence presented to the jury to support 
Horvath's conviction. As the defendants were acquitted of 
thirty-eight (38) counts of the indictment but were 
convicted of the very count to which Bonjo pleaded guilty, 
defendants contend -- and the majority concurs-- that the 
guilty pleas were not admitted for a proper purpose and 
were so prejudicial that their admission constitutes 
reversible error. Majority Op. at 17-19. 
 
I strongly disagree. In my view, the pleas of both Bonjo 
and Martin,5 after careful consideration and discussion in 
accordance with our requirements set forth in Gaev, were 
properly admitted. Even if not properly admitted, the 
evidence adduced at trial, combined with the curative 
instructions given by the District Court, rendered any error 
harmless. Indeed, the majority admits as much when it 
declares that the evidence against Lukesh and Universal is 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Majority Op. at 13- 
14. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Bonjo was charged in the same indictment as Horvath, Lukesh and 
Universal. Martin, it appears from the record, was charged separately by 
information and pled guilty to one count of mail fraud. 
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The District Court, at the time of both Bonjo's and 
Martin's testimony, gave a curative instruction, advising the 
jury that the purpose for admitting testimony concerning 
their respective plea agreements was so that they could 
"adequately assess the credibility" of the testimony. The 
jury was also instructed that the jury was not to consider 
the plea agreements as evidence of the guilt of Horvath, 
Lukesh or Universal. The District Court, while charging the 
jury at the end of the trial, instructed the jury again, as 
follows: 
 
       Julia Blum Bonjo and Penny Martin entered into plea 
       agreements with the Government. Such plea 
       agreements are expressly approved as lawful and 
       proper by the United States Supreme Court and are 
       appropriate, are proper. Each witness' decision to plead 
       guilty is a personal decision about her own guilt. You 
       may not consider this evidence against the defendants 
       on trial nor may you draw any conclusions or inferences 
       of any kind about the guilt of the defendants on trial 
       from the fact that a prosecution witness pled guilty to 
       similar charges. 
 
       The testimony of such witnesses, as I indicated, should 
       be scrutinized with caution and give it the weight that 
       you think should be given under all of the 
       circumstances. 
 
       And I indicated to you during the trial that the fact 
       that [Bonjo and Martin] entered pleas of guilty could 
       not be considered by you in determining the guilt or 
       innocence of any of the people on trial here. The only 
       reason the plea and the plea agreement were brought 
       out was so that you would know all of the 
       circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea, you'd 
       know the terms under which the plea was entered and 
       you could judge for yourselves whether the witness in 
       the trial is testifying truthfully or whether the witness 
       has a motive to embellish testimony or vary from the 
       truth. 
 
       That is the only basis or the only reason why the plea 
       and the plea agreement were admitted. 
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(Emphasis added.) This Court reviews a District Court's 
decision to admit evidence of plea agreements for abuse of 
discretion, and we have been directed in no uncertain 
terms to defer to that discretion. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 
136; Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476. 
 
Although a co-conspirator's guilty plea cannot be used as 
substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt, evidence of a 
guilty plea or plea agreement may be introduced for other 
permissible purposes. Judge Rosenn, in a cogent analysis 
of this issue in United States v. Thomas, included as proper 
purposes "(1) to bolster the credibility of the co-conspirators 
as prosecution witnesses; (2) to quell the inference that the 
co conspirators were not punished and that [the 
defendants] w[ere] thus `singled-out' for punishment; and 
(3) to establish the basis for the co-conspirators'firsthand 
knowledge of the crime about which they testified. Each of 
these is a proper purpose for admitting a guilty plea." 998 
F.2d at 1208 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See also Gaev, 24 
F.3d at 476; Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1363; United States v. 
Werme, 939 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 1092 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 383, 384 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1986). To this list should be added the 
overarching principle that trial judges have broad discretion 
to admit testimony under Rule 403 that "discloses the 
purpose, knowledge or design of a particular person." 
Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80; cf. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(recognizing, in context of expert testimony, that trial courts 
have discretion to admit such testimony, to which this 
Court must defer). The mere admission of a plea is not 
ordinarily reversible. See, e.g., Restaino, 369 F.2d 544. 
Other Circuits have also held that admission of a plea by a 
co-conspirator is appropriate for purposes other than to 
persuade a jury of a defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Tse, 135 
F.3d 200; Casto, 889 F.2d 562; Louis, 814 F.2d 852. 
 
In Gaev, this Court summarized that the underlying 
principle concerning the admissibility of a plea agreement 
as follows: "If a co-conspirator who appears as a witness 
has pleaded guilty, the trier of fact should know about the 
plea agreement in order properly to evaluate the witness's 
testimony, unless that would unduly prejudice the 
defendant." 24 F.3d at 476 (emphasis added). Moreover, as 
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the credibility of the Government's witnesses normally is 
critical to the successful prosecution of a case, this Court 
has acknowledged that the strategic admission of a guilty 
plea "dampens attacks on credibility, and forecloses any 
suggestion that [the Government] was concealing evidence. 
Such disclosure is appropriate." Gambino, 926 F.2d at 
1363. 
 
Here, the District Court permitted the introduction of the 
guilty pleas because of credibility concerns that might arise 
in the minds of the jurors as to Bonjo's and Martin's 
testimony. In addition, the District Court determined that 
the admission of the guilty pleas would allay the jurors' 
concerns -- that might arise in the absence of such 
admission -- that Horvath and Lukesh were subjected to 
selective prosecution. In making these rulings, the District 
Court, following this Court's direction in Gaev, balanced the 
probative and prejudicial impact of the pleas. The District 
Court found that, as in Gaev, credibility was an issue 
because the witnesses' testimony was challenged, and that 
the limiting instructions cured any prejudice. Even more so 
than in Thomas, here the District Court found "specific 
issues of credibility" that warranted admission of the pleas. 
 
These determinations were well within the District 
Court's discretion, and this Court must (and I emphasize 
the word must) accord the proper deference such rulings on 
admissibility by the District Court. Cf. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 
(finding discretionary decisions of trial court must be 
upheld in absence of manifest error). 
 
A fair reading of the record reveals that the District Court 
admitted the pleas for a proper purpose, and the 
Government's limited use of the guilty pleas at trial caused 
no undue prejudice that would not have been corrected by 
the District Court's curative instructions. This is not a case 
in which the prosecution placed "undue emphasis" upon 
the pleas, Restaino, 369 F.2d at 545, to convince the jury 
of the defendants' guilt. Nor is this a case in which the 
curative instruction failed to advise the jury not to consider 
the admission of guilt by the witness against the 
defendants. See Newman, 490 F.2d 139; Gullo, 502 F.2d 
759. Here, another co-defendant (Vicki Meitus) was 
acquitted of the charge alleged in Count One. This fact, 
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when combined with the curative instruction, more than 
amply supports the conclusion that admission of the pleas 
was not an abuse of discretion. See Restaino, 369 F.2d at 
546. 
 
Indeed, the majority at no point claims that the District 
Court Judge abused his discretion -- nor could it in light 
of the careful and detailed consideration that Judge Kelly 
gave to the evidence in accordance with this Court's 
direction in Gaev. See Appendix 1768-72; Memorandum of 
May 31, 1996 at 16-20. Nor does the majority point to any 
evidence in the record that could support a determination 
that the District Court abused its discretion. 
 
The only reason I can discern that the majority gives in 
holding that the guilty pleas were not admitted for a proper 
purpose was because Horvath, Lukesh and Universal 
pledged not to raise the issue of the accomplices' guilty 
pleas. Majority Op. at 16-17. Thus, the majority concludes 
that there was no need preemptively to bolster the 
credibility of the witnesses with the admission of their 
guilty pleas because the defendants would not have 
attacked Blum Bonjo and Martin on credibility grounds. 
 
In so holding, however, the majority totally ignores prior 
directions of this Court that guilty pleas can be admissible 
even in the absence of an attack on a witness' credibility. 
See Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1363 ("[E]ven in the absence of 
this attack [on the Government witness' credibility], the 
elicited testimony [i.e., the guilty plea] was proper here.") 
See also Thomas, 998 F.2d at 1208 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
As Gambino has not been overruled, it remains the rule in 
this Circuit. The absence of an attack on a witness's 
credibility is simply insufficient for a court to find that a 
judge abused his discretion in admitting the plea; here, the 
District Court cited Gambino in its post-trial ruling for 
precisely this proposition. To hold otherwise, as the 
majority does, not only presents a conflict with Gambino,6 
but it would for all time foreclose the government's 
admission of evidence of a guilty plea on direct examination 
of its witnesses by the preemptive promise by defense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 ("[N]o subsequent panel 
overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel"). 
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counsel not to question the witness concerning the plea. 
That rule is not the rule of this Circuit. See Gaev, 24 F.3d 
at 477-78 ("While plea agreements have often been 
admitted in response to actual or anticipated attacks on a 
witness's credibility, an attack is not always necessary to 
justify their introduction") (emphasis added). 
 
I urge that the Court consider this issue en banc because 
the majority opinion here -- as the majority opinion did in 
Thomas, which concerned an almost identical set of facts -- 
in effect rules out the use of any guilty plea, without regard 
to the discretion of the District Court, so long as defense 
counsel promises not to question the witness concerning 
the plea. Thomas and the analysis of the majority in the 
present case, when seen through the lens of Gaev, 
Gambino, Newman, Gullo and Restaino, makes a mockery of 
the holdings in those cases. To resolve the conflict between 
these precedents and Thomas and this case, the Court as 
a whole should confront this issue. 
 
III 
 
The majority has concluded that the evidence presented 
at trial was insufficient to support the conviction of 
Horvath, Majority Op. at 12, although there was sufficient 
evidence to support the convictions of Lukesh and 
Universal. Majority Op. at 13-14. My reading of the record 
leads me to a contrary conclusion with regard to Horvath. 
Because I conclude that the jury's verdict can be easily 
sustained by the evidence produced at trial, and that the 
admission of Bonjo's and Martin's guilty pleas does not 
affect this conclusion, I would affirm the conviction of 
Horvath. 
 
The District Court enunciated and applied the correct 
standard in reviewing a challenge to a jury verdict based on 
insufficiency of evidence. In reviewing a jury verdict, the 
court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict and presume that the jury verdict properly 
evaluated credibility of the witnesses, found the facts, and 
draw rational inferences." United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 
92, 94 (3d Cir. 1992). A conviction must be sustained if the 
verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and all 
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reasonable inferences must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Government. Id. This Court must simply 
determine whether "the conclusion chosen by the fact 
finders was permissible." United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 
222, 230 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1023 (1992). 
If there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, we 
will not reverse even though this Court may have decided 
the case differently. United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 
470 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Despite the majority's emphasis upon the fact that much 
of the evidence that the District Court relied upon to link 
Horvath to the fraudulent scheme did not directly relate to 
the Hynds incident charged in Count One, the elements of 
mail fraud do not necessitate that a defendant participate 
in every act executed in furtherance of that scheme. As the 
District Court noted, relying on Pearlstein, 576 F.2d at 541, 
the jury can infer the requisite intent from circumstantial 
evidence. 
 
To obtain a conviction under section 1341, the 
Government must establish (1) the existence of a scheme to 
defraud; (2) the participation by the defendant in the 
particular scheme charged with the specific intent to 
defraud; and (3) the use of the United States mails in 
furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. See United States v. 
Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Here, the evidence showed that Horvath, the Director of 
Finance, and Lukesh, the Director of Operations, actively 
participated in the daily operations of Universal and worked 
closely together. Both knew that Universal was having 
difficulty with Independence Blue Cross in getting its 
speech therapy services reimbursed. In addition, the 
testimony from the Universal administrators (i.e., Martin, 
Blum Bonjo, and Wendy Gold) indicated that Horvath 
and Lukesh created a "coercion" culture in which pressure 
was placed upon Universal's employees to obtain 
reimbursement in any way possible. 
 
Specifically, Gold testified that Horvath and Lukesh had 
placed her under enormous pressure to increase 
production, which included pressure to rewrite the patient 
documentation. Blum Bonjo testified that she met with 
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Horvath and Lukesh together weekly for discussions about 
cases in which Medicare denied reimbursement for the 
speech services rendered and also testified that Universal 
handled non-billable cases by rewriting patient 
documentation to make such treatment billable. 
 
Similarly, Martin testified that Horvath said that "he 
wanted the documentation billable no matter what had to 
be done to it." Some of the cases were put on hold (meaning 
that they would not be submitted for billing) because they 
did not seem appropriate for billing to Medicare. Martin 
testified that when the number of claims on hold were high, 
Horvath instructed that the claims be billed without 
doctors' signatures. Further, Martin stated that the 
documentation had to be rewritten and altered and 
originals had to be destroyed in order to avoid 
discrepancies in the documentation. Finally, the District 
Court reviewed the evidence presented at trial and found 
that Horvath was very active in the daily operations of 
Universal from the outset of the scheme, and closely 
monitored the results of the speech therapy practice. 
Horvath, through his approval of Universal's "rewriting" 
policy, sanctioned the fraudulent scheme alleged in Count 
One, for which he was found guilty. 
 
In my view, there is no question that the jury's verdict 
linking Horvath to the fraudulent scheme is supported by 
the record. There was sufficient evidence to convince the 
jury, and this Court should not "weigh evidence or 
determine the credibility of witnesses." United States v. 
Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Glasser, 
415 U.S. at 80). Reversal for insufficiency of evidence 
should not be granted except where the failure of the 
prosecution is "clear." Id. That situation is not present here. 
See also United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 480-81 
(3d Cir. 1997) ( "Only when the record contains no 
evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the 
jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an 
appellate court overturn the verdict"); United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
956 (1992). 
 
The question, then, for the jury to answer was whether 
the evidence sufficiently established that Horvath was 
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connected to the conduct charged in Count One. The jury 
determined that there was, and the record more than fairly 
supports that determination. 
 
IV 
 
As the majority has reversed the convictions on all three 
defendants, its opinion does not discuss the sentence 
imposed by the District Court, which was the subject of the 
government's cross-appeal. Although I would affirm the 
respective convictions of Horvath, Lukesh and Universal, I 
would reverse the District Court's sentence calculation 
under the Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines"), as 
presumably the issue of uncharged and acquitted conduct 
can arise again in this case. 
 
The majority opinion, oddly enough, does not reflect the 
sentences imposed upon the defendants. Let me do so. The 
District Court sentenced Universal to two years' probation 
and a $25,000 fine. Horvath and Lukesh were sentenced to 
three years of probation each. Horvath was fined $10,000, 
plus $705.20 in restitution. Lukesh was fined $15,000, 
plus restitution of $705.20. 
 
Under Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines, a District Court 
can consider relevant conduct when calculating a 
defendant's guideline range whether or not that conduct 
was formally charged. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 
148, 152-53 (1997); see also U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3 cmt. 1 ("The 
principles and limits of sentencing accountability under 
this guideline are not always the same as the principles 
and limits of criminal liability. [T]he focus is on the specific 
acts and omissions for which the defendant is to be held 
accountable . . . rather than on whether the defendant is 
criminally liable.") In addition, under Watts, a defendant's 
guideline range is affected even by acquitted conduct, as 
long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 156. See also United 
States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding conduct 
uncharged pursuant to plea agreement may be considered 
at sentencing). 
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Notwithstanding the Guidelines and Watts, at sentencing, 
the District Court declined to consider uncharged and 
acquitted conduct when calculating defendants' guidelines 
ranges. Instead, the District Court only considered the loss 
associated with the conviction obtained in Count One-- 
totaling $1,411.20 -- without explaining why it was not 
considering the uncharged and acquitted conduct that the 
Government sought to be included. I believe that this 
omission was an abuse of discretion. 
 
While I conclude that the evidence proved that Horvath, 
Lukesh, and Universal could be held accountable for the 
relevant (i.e., uncharged or acquitted) conduct, at the very 
least, the District Court should have made findings of fact 
as to why it declined to consider that conduct in the 
calculation of the sentences of Horvath, Lukesh and 
Universal. See, e.g., E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co. Inc., 626 
F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1980) (remanding because District Court 
failed to make factual findings and thus this Court could 
not determine how District Court assessed evidence). The 
District Court merely identified the standard under Watts 
and its conclusion not to consider the relevant conduct 
without stating its reasons, stating "I find under the Watts 
case that the burden is preponderance of the evidence and 
decline to include that conduct in the specific offense 
characteristics." 
 
Given that the District Court ruled in denying the post- 
conviction motion that there was substantial evidence to 
support the underlying conviction in Count One, I fail to 
understand how the District Court could conclude that the 
Government had not met its burden by a preponderance of 
the evidence of Horvath, Lukesh, and Universal's 
involvements in the other related counts of the very same 
scheme to defraud. 
 
The inclusion of uncharged and acquitted conduct, which 
may have amounted to a total loss of $343,500, would have 
resulted in an increase of eight levels under the Guidelines. 
See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(I). Horvath had an offense level of 8, 
providing a guidelines range of 0-6 months, and Lukesh 
had an offense level of 10, providing a guideline range of 6- 
12 months. If uncharged and acquitted conduct were 
considered at sentencing, however, Horvath's sentencing 
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range could have increased to 21-27 months (i.e., to offense 
level 16) and Lukesh's range could have increased to 27-33 
months (i.e., offense level 18). 
 
Accordingly, I would hold the defendants accountable at 
sentencing for the uncharged and acquitted conduct with 
which they were involved in executing their fraudulent 
scheme. 
 
V 
 
In its opinion, the majority has reversed a jury verdict 
founded on sufficient evidence and has reversed detailed 
evidentiary rulings by the District Court. In doing so, the 
majority has violated four appellate strictures: 1) it has 
ignored our established standard of review under Glasser, 
which requires that all reasonable inferences be resolved in 
favor of the government in an appeal challenging sufficiency 
of the evidence; 2) it has substituted its own "jury verdict" 
for that of the enpanelled jury; 3) it has refused to give the 
required deference to a District Court Judge's discretionary 
rulings; and 4) it has perpetuated a jurisprudential conflict 
over the admission of codefendant guilty pleas at trial. 
 
The trial transcript and post-conviction order reveal that 
the District Court carefully considered the arguments 
raised by the defendants, and rejected them in accordance 
with principles long established by prior panels of this 
Court. Under these circumstances, when the issues raised 
on appeal concern evidentiary issues addressed by the 
District Court in a careful analysis that considered the 
arguments for both sides, I am unable to agree that the 
District Court abused its discretion -- a claim that not even 
the majority justifies. 
 
In sum, therefore, I cannot subscribe to the majority 
opinion because I believe that the guilty pleas were 
admitted for a proper purpose and because there was 
sufficient evidence to support Horvath's conviction. The 
evidence revealed an elaborate scheme of fraud on the 
medical insurance system of this country, which, although 
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not acknowledged by the majority, is a continuing problem 
that has cost our country dearly.7 
 
I also conclude that the District Court erred in failing to 
state its reasons for not considering the uncharged and 
acquitted conduct of the defendants at sentencing. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See note 1, supra. 
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